



**Report of an evaluation mission in Cambodia  
from September 21 till October 19, 2002**

**by**

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**evaluation of the structure, implementation, management and perceived impact of the  
Weapons for Development projects (large and small scale) currently operating in nine  
provinces under European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms in Cambodia  
EU ASAC**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The continued availability and circulation of large quantities of illegal firearms in Cambodia is a threatening danger for the gained peace and stability in the country. In 1998, after thirty years of war, genocide and civil strife, the Royal Government of Cambodia made its first serious attempt to tackle the problems caused by the presence of these arms in the country. Meanwhile in December 1998 the Council of the European Union had created an Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Cambodian government appealed to the European Union for assistance with its activities in this field. After sending a fact-finding mission to Cambodia the Council of Ministers of the European Commission decided on 15 November 1999 to support the Royal Government of Cambodia in its effort to combat the potentially destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons throughout the country and to contribute to promoting the control, collection and destruction of weapons in the country. The Council of Ministers further stated that the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation of small arms and light weapons posed a threat to peace and security and reduced the prospects for sustainable development. In April 2000 EU ASAC (European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia) opened its office in Phnom Penh. With the arrival of the project manager 1 March 2001 project implementation started.

The project includes the following components:

- Development of appropriate laws and regulations on the ownership, possession, use, sale and transfer of arms and ammunition;
- Record keeping and the management and security of weapons stocks and in the development of policies, guidelines and practices in this area;
- Public destruction of collected and surplus weapons and ammunition through a number of provincial destruction ceremonies;
- Execution of voluntary arms surrender by the civilian population, through "Weapons for Development" projects;
- Supporting civil society programmes to raise public awareness on problems related to small arms.

This report is limited to the evaluation of the "Weapons for Development" (WfD) component of this EU ASAC programme.

In March 2001 WfD started with two large-scale pilot projects, one in Snuol District in Kratie Province, one in Bakan District in Pursat Province. The project has selected these areas based on the expectation that because of their war history a lot of small arms might be collected in these areas. The projects include raising public awareness, weapons collection, execution of development incentives, police training, provision of police equipment and support to police families. Public awareness has been raised by contracted NGOs. Weapons have been delivered on a voluntary basis with the police who at their turn brought them to the provincial authorities for destruction by burning. The development incentives have been identified, prioritised and selected by the Community Council and executed by contractors (wells, schools, health centre) or by the villagers (road sections) on a Food for Work basis.

In April 2002 WfD started with small-scale projects in seven provinces. Local NGOs initiated to submit proposals to EU ASAC to implement the public awareness and small development incentive components (wells) only; a bottom-up approach based on local knowledge of the NGOs concerned.

The Government started weapons collection already in 1998, in some areas even earlier. WfD has appeared to be successful. Increase of the number of collected weapons, decrease of the number of armed crimes, sense of security, confidence in the police, acquaintance with the project in and outside the target areas, etc. are clear indicators that the project has gained an appreciated place within the civil society and with the authorities.

Recommendations of the mission can be divided in two categories, within and outside the ongoing project activities. Within the project recommendations relate to the improvement of the administrative management system for better monitoring and information, publication ('promoting') project results, approval procedures and the termination of large-scale projects' approach. Outside the ongoing project activities recommendations bear on surveys on public opinion, education in schools as a continuation of the public awareness programme on peace and culture of peace as part of conflict prevention and to take care that the Government will hold on the started unambiguous strategy will be the same in all provinces.

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## 1.0 BACKGROUND

At the doorstep of the new millennium Cambodia has entered a new phase in the normalisation of the society. The threats and risks characterising the war and the period immediately after the war might be considered as being overcome. The efforts of the government till now have fundamentally contributed to the national reconciliation, that is indispensable for the reconstruction of the Cambodian society. This politics of reconciliation and rehabilitation of the national unity is now an unquestionable success, obtained in a very short time. Simultaneously, the foundation of the democracy and the constitutional state has been restored. Also Cambodia rises in the ranks of human development. When in 1997 Cambodia ranked 153, in 1999 it was 136 (out of 174) and in 2001 it was 121 (out of 162)<sup>1</sup>).

The continued availability and circulation of large quantities of illegal firearms, however, is a threatening danger for the gained peace and stability in the country. In 1998, after thirty years of war, genocide and civil strife, the Royal Government of Cambodia made its first serious attempt to tackle the problems caused by the presence of these arms in the country. At this time, a fragile peace had returned to the country: the last remnants of the Khmer Rouge army had given up their armed struggle and had been mostly absorbed into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. However, hundreds of thousands of weapons were still in the possession of Cambodian citizens in towns and villages throughout the country. These weapons and violence they caused in society posed a threat to the new-found stability of the country. The Royal Government issued Sub-decree No. 38 that declared private ownership of weapons to be illegal. It also set up the National Commission for Weapons Management and Reform in Cambodia to oversee the process. The Deputy-Prime Minister and Co-Minister of the Interior was appointed Chairman of the National Commission. In the ensuing months, the Cambodian police and military called upon the people to hand in their weapons and conducted searches in Phnom Penh and other major towns throughout the country. These, sometimes hard-handed, tactics produced good results in the major towns, significantly reducing the number of weapons in circulation. Success in the outlying villages and in the rural areas was less apparent, with villagers fearing for their own safety if they had no weapons to protect themselves. At the same time, the villagers were able to hide their weapons in the fields or forests out of reach of the ill-equipped police force. In this way 1998 and 1999 the government collected over 100,000 weapons.

Notwithstanding all the problems, this was a laudable initiative by the Cambodian government to limit the possession and use of small arms by the civilian population. On 5 May 1999 the Cambodian government took their small arms campaign a step further by beginning to destroy the collected weapons in a series of large public ceremonies in various provincial capitals. Using a bulldozer to crush the weapons, the government destroyed 36,505 in seven such ceremonies. The last crushing ceremony was held in March 2000.

Meanwhile the Council of the European Union had created an Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons on 17 December 1998 and the Cambodian government appealed to the European Union for assistance with its activities in this field. After sending a fact-finding mission to Cambodia the Council of Ministers of the European Commission decided on 15 November 1999 to support the Royal Government of Cambodia in its effort to combat the potentially destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons throughout the country and to contribute to promoting the control, collection and destruction of weapons in the country. The Council of Ministers further stated that the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation of small arms and light weapons posed a threat to peace and security and reduced the prospects for sustainable development. In April 2000 EU ASAC (European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia) opened its office in Phnom Penh.

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<sup>1</sup> ) The ranking, which placed Cambodia just above "low development", is based on such factors as life expectancy, education, per-capita income and adult literacy (UNDP annual human development reports)

## 2.0 INTRODUCTION

A project proposal was already designed summer 2000 positing a set of interlocking components:

- a new arms law
- an awareness programme
- voluntary weapons' collection
- weapons' destruction

After analysing several options for voluntary weapon collection from the civilian population, and after conducting feasibility studies by EU ASAC in a number of provinces, the most promising approach seemed to be a weapons in exchange for a development incentive. Weapons for Development (WfD) could benefit communities as a whole. It has proven to be successful in other countries. WfD is a political concept, aimed at building confidence and reducing violence through illegal firearms.

In two pilot projects (so called large-scale WfD projects), one in Snuol District (Kratie province), one in Bakan District (Pursat Province), people at the community level have been encouraged to turn-in arms. National NGOs have played an important role in this approach which has given equal emphasis to five key elements:

1. advocacy and public awareness
2. community involvement and reward
3. improvement of the capacity of public authorities
4. voluntary anonymous surrender of weapons
5. public destruction of the collected weapons

Seven so called small scale WfD projects are under implementation in seven provinces (Kampot, Kompong Spue, Kompong Som, Battambang, Pailin, Takao and Kompong Cham province). Local NGOs initiated to submit proposals to EU ASAC to implement

1. public awareness
2. small development incentive components (wells)

This bottom-up approach, based on local knowledge of the NGOs concerned, has several advantages.

In Chapter 4 the various Weapons for Development projects and the findings of the consultant are extensively described.

## 3.0 THE EVALUATION MISSION

EU ASAC has engaged Buwalda BNA from Doesburg in The Netherlands, to carry out in the person of Johan P. Buwalda an evaluation of Weapons for Development, covering the pilot projects in Kratie and Pursat Provinces and the small-scale NGO WfD projects<sup>2</sup>). Johan P. Buwalda, senior consultant and director of Buwalda BNA, has 25 years experience in different aspects of development in overseas countries, the last 10 years mainly in post-conflict situations. As the UNDP Project Manager in 2001 he completed successfully the "Weapons in Exchange for Development" project in Albania. The evaluation mission took place from September 21 till October 19, 2002.

### 3.1 Objectives of the evaluation

A final evaluation of the structure, implementation, management and perceived impact of the two large scale Weapons for Development pilot projects in Snuol District (Kratie Province) and Bakan District (Pursat Province) and the effectiveness of the above projects in relation to the smaller scale Weapons for Development project, currently operating in seven provinces in Cambodia. The mission needs to consider these projects individually and in terms of how the Weapons for Development concept has been developed and implemented under EU ASAC.

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<sup>2</sup> ) see Terms of Reference (annex 1)

## 3.2 Strategy of the evaluation

### 3.2.1 A research period in the capital, Phnom Penh:

This involved as a start meetings with various EU ASAC staff. It also involved meetings with various organisations involved in the WfD project, for example Partners for Development (an international NGO responsible for the provision of development in Snuol District). A third category were meetings with other international agencies active in development and working at national level with the government, e.g. EU, UNDP and representatives of the Seila programme of UNDP/UNOPS. In this period the consultant had access to documents, data and individuals relevant to the evaluation.

### 3.2.2. Field Visits to large-scale WfD pilot projects:

The consultant has visited both pilot project target areas in Pursat and Kratie. During these visits, the consultant has met with the EU ASAC WfD field managers and with organisations involved with implementing aspects of the pilot projects. He also inspected the development provided under the project and spoke to local target groups. He met with the police in both target areas to assess the impact of the police support component. This last element was considered very important. EU ASAC staff has provided the Consultant with a travel schedule for the required field visits and all logistic support necessary for him to effectively carry out the evaluation. For interviewing the consultant has used the funnel method through open questions that led to the required information on public awareness, weapons collection and destruction, development assistance and capacity building of the police (through both software and hardware).

### 3.2.3 Field visits to small-scale WfD projects:

The consultant has visited a number of small scale WfD projects which included meetings with the various NGOs responsible for implementing the project in the different areas and has attended a public awareness workshop. He has met representatives of the security forces in that area and also local people. Because of time and expense constraints and because the strategy behind all these small WfD projects is the same, the consultant has not visited every project.

## 4.0 WEAPONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

### 4.1 General <sup>3)</sup>

#### Large Scale Weapons for Development Projects

EU ASAC is currently running two large scale WfD pilot projects in 2 provinces in Cambodia; Pursat (in the Northwest) and Kratie (in the Southeast, close to the Vietnamese border). Both projects are confined to 5 communes (the lowest level of local government in Cambodia) in one district – so 5 communes in Bakan District in Pursat and 5 communes in Snuol District in Kratie.

These WfD projects consist of 4 inter-related strategy components:

1. Public Awareness on the negative effects of weapons possession on peace, security and development prospects.
2. Police Support – Consisting of: a) Human rights and good governance training b) professional skills training c) provision of basic technical equipment e.g. motorbikes, radios etc. d) provision of sustainable income generation training / support to the families of the police. Weapons often continued to be retained due to the inability of the police to provide effective security.
3. Provision of community-owned development incentives e.g. water wells, health posts, schools, rural roads etc. depending on development priorities in the village. This is **not** a buy back scheme and no financial or individual rewards are provided. Rather the development is intended to demonstrate the progressive link between peace, security and

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<sup>3)</sup> see Terms of Reference (annex 1)



development. It must be stressed that WfD is **not** a development programme but rather a weapons collection programme, which aims to increase physical security primarily and human security as a related effect. The programme must therefore be evaluated as such.

4. Collection and destruction of weapons from the civil population – Though it should be noted that neither EU ASAC nor client NGOs actually collect weapons but rather encourage the local community to voluntarily hand them over to the police. It should be noted that accurate numbers of weapons originally held in the target areas were almost impossible to quantify, thereby making it impossible to use the number of collected weapons as the sole indicator of the progress towards the achievement of the objectives. By its very nature, WfD is a political rather than a development project.

#### Short-term Goals:

1. To improve physical security in the target area by encouraging the removal of as many weapons and, to a lesser extent, explosives held illegally by the civil population as possible.
2. To raise public awareness about the negative effects weapons possession has on the community at large in terms of physical and human security and the progressive link between peace, security and development.
3. To provide for greater visibility and mobility of the local police and gendarmerie

#### Mid-term Goals:

1. To increase the sense of trust within and between local communities
2. To increase the trust between local communities and the institutions responsible for the provision of security i.e. the police and gendarmerie.
3. To strengthen local civil society organisations.
4. To sensitise local and national authorities to the benefits of voluntary weapons hand in programmes.
5. To provide a modicum of human security improvement through the provision of small scale community owned development projects.

#### Long-term Goals:

1. To improve the overall professionalism of the police and gendarmerie to a degree relative to the extent of the support provided.
2. To improve the human security of the local civil population through opening the area up to investment and development from other agencies.
3. To decrease the overall extent of violence within and between communities and provide the basis for long-term sustainable security and development.

Both these projects began in 2001 and are now nearing completion. Thus far the civil population has voluntarily handed in about 3,200 weapons and 14,500 explosives in Kratie and 2,500 weapons and 4,200 explosives in Pursat. These weapons were mostly those which people kept on their properties, though approximately 1,000 have come from weapons caches revealed by the target groups.

In Kratie, the project was funded by the EU, the Netherlands government (police support and development) and Canadian government (human rights training). In Pursat the project was funded by the EU, the Japanese government (development) and the German government (police support).

#### **Small Scale Weapons for Development Projects**

In addition to the large scale projects, EU ASAC is also running smaller scale projects which do not include the police support component and provide smaller scale development (only water wells). These projects are implemented solely by local Khmer NGOs (the larger scale projects have a resident Khmer EU ASAC field manager) who conduct public awareness workshops in the target areas.

Following a pilot project involving two local NGOs in 2001, this project has been expanded in 2002 to seven provinces: Kompong Spue, Kompong Cham, Kompong Som, Pailin, Battambang, Takeo and Kompot. EU ASAC has provided the NGOs with training (on financial and narrative reporting and on presentation techniques), training materials (a training manual

for participants and a more detailed one for trainers and two public awareness films; a documentary and a drama) and equipment (a DVD player, generator etc.). These projects began in mid-May 2002 and as at 11 September 2002 over 1,500 weapons have been handed in by the target groups.

## **4.2 Findings In Kratie Province - Snuol District**

### 4.2.1 General

The District of Snuol lies on the eastern borders of Cambodia, between the wildest areas of Kampong Cham Province to the south, with the even more remote mountains of Mondul Kri Province to the north, and Vietnam's Song Bé Province to the east. Snuol is where the Cambodian communist party was created, where the Viet Minh and Viet Cong found refuge, and where the Khmer Rouge had some of their most important military bases. Here too, on 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1978, the national liberation front was formed at Pir Thnou (which means "2<sup>nd</sup> December"): this Front, with Vietnamese help, finally rid Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge dictatorship and became the Cambodian People's Party, in power today since the elections of 1998. There are believed to be large stocks of weapons remaining in these forest areas.

Main road from Kratie to Snuol is in a poor condition but is under reconstruction with a loan from the Asian Development Bank. Left and right of this road some small parcels of land are cleared for agriculture. The roads in the Snuol district are very bad. People mainly live from the forest and are poor.

### 4.2.2 Public Awareness

The Cambodian Institute for Human Rights (CIHR), a local NGO, has been contracted to implement the public awareness component training opinion leaders of target groups. During its visit the mission included in his interviews with civilian people several times the question what the EU ASAC project is about. It appeared that the opinion leaders answered correctly that it aims to collect weapons as part of a peace and security process that is an essential basis for development. The 'grass root' people answered that EU ASAC is helping the poor and provides facilities. Most of the people, however, know from posters that weapons need to be turned with to the police. The relation between the donation of development incentives and the delivery of weapons was scarcely made.

### 4.2.3 Development Incentives <sup>4)</sup>

The NGO Partners for Development (PfD) has been working in the villages for the past 8 years. The result is a network of well-organised Village Development Committees (VDCs). Although the Department of Rural Development (DRD) supports the creation of VDCs, experience shows that local committees only take on confidence and leadership when they had several years of development experience supported by others. Since December 2001 EU ASAC has a co-operation agreement with PfD that has implemented the following development projects in the District:

- Construction of 45 drilled water wells. PfD has paid for the well construction. EU ASAC has taken over the community contribution, namely the sand, rock and gravel amounting to a total of not more than US\$ 150.00 per well, in exchange for the pre-agreed number of voluntary surrendered weapons.
- Repair of twenty-one hand dug wells.
- Construction of two three-classrooms' school.
- Repair of a wooden two-classrooms' school.
- Construction of four two-unit latrines at four schools.
- Construction of one primary health care post.

The projects have been prioritised by the VDCs and have been tendered and implemented by contractors. Road reconstruction projects have been carried out by the villagers through 'food for work' (FfW). Total cost of development incentives is US\$ 174,563.

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<sup>4)</sup> see table annex 2 for detailed information on weapons and development in Snuol

#### 4.2.3 Weapons collection and destruction

At the time the mission was taking place since February 2001, 3230 small arms and 14,354 pieces of ammunition has been collected.

2,754 weapons have been destroyed in a 'Flames for Peace' ceremony on July 2001 at Kratie airport; 36 in October 2001 at Snuol Police Inspection; 369 in November 2001 at forest area; 11 on March 2002 at Pravanh village (see annex 2).

#### 4.2.4 Police Support <sup>5)</sup>

Weapons often continued to be retained due to the inability of the police to provide effective security caused by lack of adequate transport and communication equipment and lack of knowledge of typical issues related to professional action.

The assistance to the police is three fold:

1. Training in different subjects by the Cambodian Institute of Development and Human Rights (CIDH) with the objectives:
  - to increase police awareness of their role as a public institution responsible for providing security to the civil population
  - to increase the local population's confidence in the ability and willingness of the local police to provide security once they have handed in their weapons.Topics of a three months' training for example are basic precepts of law and order, knowledge of Cambodian laws, UN Declaration of Human Rights, principles of good governance, etc.
2. Improving police equipment: The police received transport in the form of bicycles and/or motorbikes for quick movement to the action area, communication equipment consisting of a central radio and portables for quick information on the action, sometimes a camera to record the situation. The police received training on the use and maintenance of all these facilities. In the meantime this support has already been proved to be very fruitful.
3. Increase of income through family support: Police wives are trained in breeding animals, growing crops or sewing and selling of garments. A cow or ox, a pig, a sewing machine is presented to work with. In this way the income can be doubled or tripled.

The police posts in this district are very poor, made from timber poles and planks having a saddleback covered with corrugated iron sheets. There is no floor and the poor furniture is standing in the sand. To secure temporary storage of collected weapons an iron cupboard with padlock was provided.

### **4.3 Findings In Pursat Province - Bakan District**

#### 4.3.1 General

The District of Bakan lies south of the Tonle Sap Lake, at the foot of the Cardamom Mountains on the Thai border. The southern part of the district is wild forest. There are still a lot of weapons in this area, which was so unstable in 1998 that the National census did not even visit the neighbouring district of Phnum Kravanh. This was also Khmer Rouge country (base of the faction led by the redoubtable Ta Mok, the man who finally executed Pol Pot ... if he did) and all the areas to the Thai frontier are rumoured to hold secret weapons, which could destabilise Cambodia once again.

The district is enclosed by the main Route 5 that leads from Phnom Penh to Sisophon, and then on to the Thai frontier at Poipet. The road, large sections are still very bumpy, is under reconstruction with a loan from the Asian Development Bank. Canals in South North direction form as it were the administrative division of the province into districts and communes North which discharge the water from the mountains to the lake.

Main means of subsistence are agriculture and fishing. Roughly saying north of Route 5 rice is the main product, south of this road dry rice and vegetables. The area south of the Tonle Sap Lake is flooded every year during two or three months because of the high level of the Mekong river. Since some years the rainy season is moving but the farmers still follow the old calendar of planting and hence the floods cause a tremendous damage to the young rice plants that are flooded and will not produce seeds. This year Cambodia itself has suffered

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<sup>5)</sup> see table annex 3 for detailed information on police support in Snuol

from drought but the northern countries got a lot of rain. Strangely enough within the same district the southern part is suffering from drought and its harvest got lost because of lack of water. The northern part is suffering from floods and its harvest got lost because of too much water.

Village Development Committees (VDC) are well institutionalised and have been strengthened by Seila (coming from Sanskrit the word means "foundation stone"), a policy arm of the national government run by the Department of Rural Development. All the communities in the Bakan district have functioning VDCs. Their development plans are discussed within the Commune Council and included for financing in the Commune Investment Plan. Subjects like irrigation, fishing rights, maintenance of infrastructure, banking systems, etc. are subjects in their meetings. ASAC has received strong support from UNDP-Carere, which is Seila's primary partner since 2000 and proved fully capable to implement the development aspect of the WfD pilot project.

#### 4.3.2 Public Awareness

The Police Inspection in Pursat Province reported that a public awareness programme started already in 1997 to educate civilian population, civil servants, monks, teachers and students encouraging them to hand in their weapons to the police. The Cambodian Institute for Development and Human Rights (CIDH) is one of the civil society organisations running a public awareness campaign in partnership with ASAC. Trust of the civilians in the police is increasing.

#### 4.3.3 Development Incentives <sup>6)</sup>

In Pursat province, EU ASAC co-operates directly with the Provincial Rural Development Committee (PRDC) for the implementation of the development projects. PRDC is part of the Seila project, established in 1996 by the Government as a decentralised system for planning, finance and administration. It is an interdepartmental task force, comprising representatives from seven ministries and is supported by UNDP (until recently Carere, now through PLG). This supervision and assistance guarantees operational and financial transparency also guarantees that the development projects under WfD are those which are of priority to the community concerned. Discussions on other needs are related to e.g. banking systems, fishing ponds, irrigation schemes etc. Subjects that have the attention in Bakan district. In the framework of WfD in Bakan district the following projects have been implemented:

- Four three rooms' schools (no toilets included)
- Three wooden bridges
- Fifteen pipe culverts
- One box culvert
- Twelve road sections (on a food for work basis).

#### 4.3.4 Weapons collection and destruction

From 1997 till 1999 the police collected in Pursat province a total of 2,962 weapons. Since EU ASAC has started in August 2000 till October 2002 in Bakan district 5,017 weapons have been confiscated. In collaboration with police and local authorities the project has destroyed 1044 weapons in a destruction ceremony.

There has been a noticeable reduction in crime involving firearms in the area in the recent months. The collection of large numbers of weapons also reduces the risk of future destabilisation. The majority of crimes continue to be theft of livestock and motorbikes and rape of underage girls. One of the major difficulties in Bakan is its geographical location. Many of the problems are caused by criminals who come down the national route from Battambang rather than emanating from Bakan itself.

#### 4.3.5 Police support <sup>7)</sup>

See also paragraph 4.2.4. In this district the mission visited inter alia a six months' training programme for women including designing, cutting and sewing of clothes, as part of the donation of sewing machines for police family support. After the course the women are able to produce one shirt per hour, market price Riel 5,000 (material cost Riel 2,500). In five villages

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<sup>6)</sup> see table annex 4 for detailed information on weapons and development in Snuol

<sup>7)</sup> see table annex 5 for detailed information on police support in Bakan

13 sewing machines including training have been delivered. Other family support projects include the donation of water pumps for rice farming, oxen for transport and ploughing, cows, pigs and chickens (when pen available). The donation of these animals was also accompanied by training courses on breeding and growing.

In this district the project contributed to the construction of some police posts at the cost of US\$ 900 (originally budgeted US\$ 500). Timber is cut in the forest with the permission of the police authorities but without following the rules of the government that only one private company has a license on logging. EU ASAC pays the invoices of the bought materials. Commune and police deliver the labour.

#### **4.4 Small-scale WfD projects**

##### **4.4.1 Background**

In 2000, EU ASAC was approached by a number of local Cambodian NGOs who proposed to conduct public awareness workshops on the dangers of small arms in an effort to persuade local communities to voluntarily hand in their weapons to the police.

EU ASAC accepted the proposals of three local NGOs on the basis of four precepts:

1. The low cost of implementing the projects; each project was budgeted at less than S\$30,000.
2. Supporting the projects fitted into the policy of 'point and shoot' implementation i.e. adjusting and adapting the EU ASAC programme as and when opportunities arose.
3. Supporting local civil society organisations and increasing their capacity was part of the mandate of EU ASAC.
4. Supporting this alternative, small-scale WfD projects would provide a tangible comparative to the larger WfD projects being implemented in Bakan and Snuol districts.

Following the implementation of the public awareness campaigns, the three local NGOs succeeded in encouraging the civilians in de hand over of 2351 weapons and 273 pieces of explosives. The weapons were destroyed in "Flame of Peace" ceremonies in April 2001, on 4 December 2001 and on 24 June 2002.

Encouraged by the results of these campaigns the project aimed to see the larger WfD projects move away from more expensive projects such as schools to smaller, cheaper, more geographically spread projects such as water wells.

##### **4.4.2 Heightened Interest in 2002**

By early 2002, proposals had been received from 13 local NGOs from all over Cambodia. Based on the experiences in 2001, EU ASAC decided to standardise all aspects of the training in terms of budget lines, training materials and financial and narrative reporting and provision of small-scale development in the form of water wells.

Four national NGOs were invited to produce a training manual under the chairmanship of the president of CHRTF. He was chosen for this task since he is widely regarded and respected by both Khmer and international organisations as being one of the few individuals / organisations to be above political wrangling.

EU ASAC also oversaw the production of two public awareness films; a documentary and a drama to be shown at the workshops. A number of administrative forms were also produced, in particular a weapons record form that the NGO had to take to the police to have the weapons recorded and confirmed. EU ASAC produced a survey to be filled out by participants at the start of the training sessions. EU ASAC also purchased equipment (DVD players, generators) for use by the NGOs in their workshops.

##### **4.4.3 Implementation**

As the projects progressed through the year positive results, problems and possible solutions have immediately presented themselves. One of the benefits of the closer control by EU ASAC has been relatively swift response to these issues.

#### 4.4.4 Positive Results

- The NGOs and the target participants have reacted very positively to the support by EU ASAC. Many have stated that the support provided by EU ASAC has been far better than their experiences with other foreign donors.
- Since the start of the projects approximately 10,000 people have attended public awareness workshops. In all the workshops, the participants have consisted of a cross section of society and included the local police, gendarmerie and army, monks, ex-Khmer Rouge, village, commune and district chiefs and other civil leaders and ordinary citizens including many women.
- Since the start of the projects, over 2000 weapons and an equal number of explosives (ammunition, mines, grenades etc) have been voluntarily handed in by the participants to their local police. Barring a few exceptions, the local police as being in their possession has verified all of these weapons. Local NGOs provide quarterly reports to EU ASAC outlining the number of weapons collected, problems encountered, lessons learnt etc. For numbers of weapons collected so far, see Annex One. It should be noted that the figures provided are only those provided since the last reports and verbal reports from the NGOs place the collected weapons significantly above the 2000 mark.
- Since the start of the project approximately 35 water wells have been constructed in the target areas by the NGOs in return for the voluntary hand over of weapons to the local authorities. Again, these figures relate to the most recent reports.
- The nature of the workshops has meant that authorities and ordinary citizens have been brought together often for the first time in a single-issue event. This has gone a long way to improving relations between the authorities and civil society and also given local people a chance to air their views and grievances in the presence of authorities and vice versa for the first time.
- EU ASAC is in the process of developing a database from the surveys which will enable it to address the issues in communities more effectively in the future.

#### 4.4.5 Problems of NGOs

- It is a fact that the ability of Khmer organisations to meet the reporting (both narrative and financial) requirements of western donors is lacking. It is also the case that western donors often overestimate the capacity of local NGOs and fail to understand the culture surrounding such organisations.
- There have been a number of minor problems concerning financial efficacy with some of the NGOs but these have mostly been due to misunderstandings of the concept of budget lines. Problems with narrative reporting have been less widespread.
- The national government (in particular the National Commission on Weapons Management and Reform) continues to be highly sceptical of the role of NGOs in conducting public awareness related to weapons collection. There continues to be misunderstanding and mistrust of the NGOs which can be largely traced back to the aloofness of the Commission to the work of EU ASAC.
- From observations in the field, it is clear that local NGOs require far more support from EU ASAC in terms of the presentation and dissemination of the target message. Provision of materials is a first positive step but if civil society capacity building is to be taken seriously, more effort should be made to enhance the ability of organisations to do more than just give lectures.

#### 4.4.6 Local Situations

- Every single NGO has reported that most ordinary people are happy to surrender their weapons but the problems still come from the culture of impunity, which characterises Khmer society. High ranking police, army and government officials and their friends / family / colleagues continue to operate above the law. A local NGO working with the support of a remote foreign donor has little opportunity to overcome entrenched social realities.
- The local police at the rural level have minimal training or resources and this remains the biggest hindrance to their ability to provide security. Every single NGO has requested that EU ASAC provide a degree of support to the local police.
- A number of NGOs have had difficulty in building the necessary relationships with the local authorities so that effective monitoring of the project can occur. On the other hand,

many of the NGOs have built admirable networks in their communities that in some cases will be used as models for 2003.

- Local communities often deeply mistrust the police and often do not wish to hand in weapons directly to them for fear of retribution. In a number of cases, the local NGO needs to act as a go-between which risks blurring the lines between public awareness and collection.
- Weather has had a large impact on the progress of the workshops. Many areas have become inaccessible due to flooding and the late arrival of the monsoon has meant that many of the participants have been kept in their fields later than usual forcing major rescheduling of the workshops.

#### 4.4.7 EU ASAC

- EU ASAC made a number of procurement errors at the start of the project in particular in relation to the size and weight of the generators.
- EU ASAC does not have the manpower or resources to effectively monitor and control the whole project. There is not nearly enough direct contact with the field, which has meant that crucial issues have been dealt with late or not discovered at all. The extent to which the local NGOs need and appreciate support from EU ASAC cannot be underestimated. This is of particular importance to the small scale WfD projects since the issues differ widely from area to area.
- EU ASAC has developed no effective mechanism to guarantee that the weapons reported by the NGO/ police to have been handed in correspond exactly to those held by the police and whether the police continue to retain them. EU ASAC possesses records stamped by the police who confirm the type, serial number and location of the weapons but so far EU ASAC staff has viewed none of these weapons. In addition, there have been no effective mechanisms developed for the removal of the weapons from district level police posts to more secure provincial or national stores or plans for their destruction. Of particular concern is the fate of the many explosives, which currently reside with the local police forces.
- In designing the small-scale programme, EU ASAC has not developed a means of addressing how the local security situation has improved beyond the number of weapons collected. The surveys will provide a modicum of indication but not enough since they only assess a single point in time at the start of the workshops.

#### 4.4.8 Solutions

As a result of experiences in 2002, EU ASAC is making plans to improve and substantiate the small-scale projects for 2003.

It is clear that the implementation of public awareness using grassroots organisations is effective in stimulating communities to turn in their weapons though it is also clear that public awareness and small scale development provision alone are not adequate to guarantee sustainable security.

EU ASAC plans to integrate a number of new elements into the programme in 2003:

- Public Awareness conducted by local NGO
- Provision of micro-development(wells) by local NGO
- Sanitation training conducted by local NGO
- Well maintenance conducted by local NGO
- Police training conducted by national NGO/MOL
- Weapons Cache recovery by EU/MOL/MND/CMAC
- Explosive disposal conducted by CMAC
- Mine Awareness conducted by CMAC
- Monitoring and support provided by EU ASAC

## 5.0 ANALYSIS

### 5.1 General

To evaluate WfD it is necessary to go back to the start of this project component and to take notice of the background of the initiative, to learn about the objectives and the expectations, and to compare the results with it. In general a Project Document is prepared as the basis of an agreement between the Executing Agency and the Government of the country concerned. The Project Document is the administrative document to implement the described activities and to tune them on objectives (short-term, mid-term and long-term), time line and budget and indicates of monitoring the progress and results. Beneficiaries of the project are clearly defined. In general the final, by donors and government approved, project proposal will be promoted into the Project Document and signed by the Government and the implementing Agency.

EU ASAC has no agreement with the Cambodian Government. EU ASAC has no Project Document. The only guidelines for the Project Manager are his Terms of Reference (TOR) and a budget of the operation). The TOR comes mainly down to continue with the various components of the project, to use appropriate procedures, to allocate financial aid to support local NGO activities and to encourage and assist other donors to support efforts to reduce and control small arms. No specific objectives, no criteria for decision making, no exit strategy. The implementation of the project is totally depending on the expertise and experience of the Project Manager, his assessment of the situation and judgement of his opportunities and targets, his creativity, his initiatives and his co-ordination and management capacities. E.g. the objectives of the TOR have been formulated at the moment the consultant has asked for it. They are not included in an agreed document. On one side it makes the implementation of the project interesting and challenging, on the other side the consultant has no clear indicators to measure and to compare.

To evaluate the Weapons for Development (WfD) component of the EU ASAC programme a considerable number of documents of distinguished experts are available to learn about the history of it. In the summer of 2000 Dr. Robin Poulton studied the feasibility of Weapons for Development to consider whether it might be possible to carry out a voluntary weapons collection programme (VWCP) using the mechanism of disarmament in exchange for development projects. Project locations were selected based on various considerations, like:

- Information on the (expected) presence of high numbers of weapons (previous war area)
- Number of crimes where arms are involved (according to the police and administration authorities most crimes are carried out by soldiers or ex-soldiers)
- The general longing for peace by the inhabitants of the area
- The political commitment of the local authorities to cooperate
- The presence of NGO's

Based on these criteria Snuol District (Kratie Province) and Bakan District (Pursat province) were selected to start in both areas a pilot project and a proposal for these projects have been produced. Although this proposal includes a lot of useful guidelines for implementation and monitoring it has never been officially approved by the donors and therefore it may not be used as the basic document for evaluation.

Within the WfD component the following inter-related activities are noticed:

- Public Awareness
- Weapons Collection (and removal for destruction)
- Development Incentives
- Capacity Building of the Police (both with hardware and software)

The question is how to evaluate the effectiveness of the project component when basic indicators are lacking. Before specifying what kind of indicators are needed, we have to analyse in a wider scope the meaning and objectives of these activities within Weapons for Development. And what is the objective of Weapons for Development as a whole?

WfD is part of EU ASAC, a Weapon Management Project. The presence of weapons in the country is *inter alia* a cause of insecurity. It is, however, not only the presence of weapons.



For firing a shot three elements are needed to come together: the weapon, the bullet and the mind (to pull the trigger). When one of these elements is missing there is no shooting. When there is no shooting the situation is secure. EU ASAC is collecting and destroying weapons to reduce the chance that weapons will be used. But the ultimate objective is 'peace and security'. And peace and security, both human and physical, are pre-conditions for development. When 'peace and security' is the ultimate objective of the project, then we have to identify indicators to see how and to what extent the (inter-related) activities (see above) contribute to this objective.

## **5.2 Advocacy and public awareness**

Public awareness is the most important strategy component of the EU ASAC programme. In the TOR for the evaluation mission it is characterised as raising "public awareness on the negative effects of weapons possession on peace, security and development prospects". This indication covers a very wide scope of information and therefore a training programme has been prepared. For this purpose a manual has been issued together with a film on videocassette and DVD disc. The manual includes the following chapters:

- Information on the EU ASAC programme
- Effects of the use of weapons (insecurity, death threats)
- Law and regulations
- Law on penalties for weapons possession and wearing uniforms when not in service
- Sub-degree on firearms and explosives control
- Sub-degree on management and control of importation, manufacture, trade, etc.
- Rights and responsibilities of civilian population/society and authorities
- Morality: roles and duties of national police, gendarmerie and army
- Respect for religious laws
- Appeal of measures

The manual was prepared for EU ASAC by four national human rights or disarmament NGO's co-operating together. All four NGO's have wide training experience. It is a typical Khmer document and therefore beyond Western critics. Interesting is the chapter on respect for religious laws. Viewing Cambodian television these useful thoughts might be shared with the producers and broadcasting stations of films full of violence and cruelties. Nevertheless the manual lacks essential information on how to handle in case a weapon or explosive has been detected. Important instructions and ideas could be included how to encourage other people to take the decision to deliver their weapons or to inform the police on weapons caches. The consultant has noticed that this instruction was one of the main topics in the public awareness programme in the large scale WfD projects.

## **5.3 Community involvement and reward**

This issue has been criticised not only on this programme in Cambodia, but also in other countries where voluntary delivery of weapons has been linked with projects within the framework of development. There are questions on the relation between the number of weapons collected and the value of the project; or whether it will work that a personal initiative of an individual be rewarded to the community? Questions if voluntary delivery should be disguised with a reward. Which moment is the best to start the development project; before, during or after the collection? Is the development project the final action of the weapons collection? Etc.

Another kind of discussions is around the indication 'development'. Development is a process and the weapons programme is not a development process but a step towards security and peace. The donation of a school, a well, a road, might be indicated as incentives as part of the social or physical infrastructure although it is more. The donation of these incentives has followed a participatory approach in the identification, selection, implementation, monitoring and maintenance.

Despite all of these colourful discussions and critics around this issue, WfD has been proven to be a success. Success in the meaning of encouraging people to deliver their weapons; as part of the public awareness in the area concerned; as a fulfilment of one of their needs; as a permanent monument to remind the community that the delivery was a successful common

effort. Nevertheless the question arises as to whether EU ASAC should be involved in the implementation of these development incentives or leave them completely to (professional) partners working in the area concerned.

The question is still to what percentage of the budget the 'incentives' may form. Also this part of the project has been criticised by agencies active in development, saying that the resources could have been optimised by spreading them over a larger area. It is necessary to realise that the large-scale WfD projects are pilot ones. One of the lessons learned is that the incentives have encouraged the people and that the experience has led to continue with this strategy on small scale. The limited budget is the basis for constantly re-assessing the extent of the expenses, which budget lines to be charged and the best results for the project.

#### **5.4 Improvement of the capacity of public authorities**

The project has well understood that efficient functioning of the executive public authorities on the ground, in this case the police, is essential for the success of the programme. Therefore special attention is given to the well-being of the police, both when in service and in private life. Because of the low salaries (US\$ 18.00/month) it is impossible to survive without additional income. Since Cambodia - as many other countries in the world - knows a "boss-servant" society (everybody has to pay for the goodwill of people on whom they are dependent), the police are not excluded from that. This system does not promote a good relationship between the civilians and the police. Any previous positive relationship had already been destroyed, as just after the war the police were often accused of being involved in criminal activities.

#### **5.5 Voluntary surrender of weapons**

The number of collected weapons is generally used as the indicator to express the success of the programme. This is, however, questionable when it is unknown how many weapons are in the area concerned. And it is unknown. Police inspectors have made an estimate how many weapons they expect to be collected in their area but it is not based on any real information. Based on the number of households a certain percentage may be guessed: one weapon on three families, on five? To have a target, however, a 'guestimate' of the expected number of weapons to be collected in the commune concerned have been recorded in the tables.

Still we have the duty to express the effectiveness of the programme.

One is to compare the number of collected weapons during the course of time. In 1998 and 1999 - before EU ASAC has started - the government collected over 100,000 weapons. The consultant has asked the Governors of the provinces Kratie and Pursat to provide the mission records of the weapons collected during this period in the project districts Snuol and Bakan, preferably broken down per month. The development in the number of collected weapons since the project has been launched will give an indication how the people have responded to the project through their delivery of the weapons and, based on that, an indication of the effectiveness of the strategy might be concluded.

It must be emphasised that the mandate of the WfD projects is to assist the Cambodian authorities in their attempts to curb light weapons. EU ASAC is not running the system itself. Therefore the project has no evidence about the legitimacy of the figures the police are releasing, neither from the figures before the project, nor from the figures of collected weapons within the project. The police produce records complete with the registration number of the collected weapons. In Pursat the project staff is not allowed to check; in Snuol they can. In small NGO projects the weapons registration numbers are not recorded. There are no certificates of receipt because anonymity is assured. The weapons are brought to the District authorities and from there to the Provincial ones. The parties do not certify all these transmissions involved.

Another indicator of the effectiveness of the programme is to compare the number of armed crimes during the time. The consultant has asked the Police Inspectors of the project areas to provide the mission records of the number of armed crimes during 1998 and 1999 and during

the period EU ASAC has been active. A change in the number of crimes might give some information on the effectiveness of the project.

Last one is a pragmatic one to see how the people in the project area respond to the progress of weapons collection: increasing feeling of security, growing confidence in the police, increase of travelling in the area, increase of farming on remote land, etc. It has been noticed that these indicators show a positive development of a feeling of safety and security in the project area.

## **5.6 Public destruction of collected weapons**

Public weapons destruction is a pre-condition for EU ASAC to co-operate with the Government of Cambodia in weapons collection. Destruction has several objectives, like:

- A political one. A surplus of weapons in a country is difficult to control and very capital intensive to maintain.
- A security one. Destroyed weapons can not be used anymore: "One weapon less, one life more".
- Public awareness. From the different methods in use in the world EU ASAC has chosen for burning the weapons, calling it "Flames of Peace". A big ceremony is organised around this spectacle with all media invited. By doing it like this it has a great impact in the society.
- Building confidence. The public notices that the collected weapons will not be hidden in obscure stores to be brought out in case of emergency or to be used during dark hours by the collectors.

Although the method is quite a spectacle it is quite expensive. The fire needs to be very hot to assure that the weapons will completely pass into scrap. Besides the ceremony itself consumes precious money from the budget. This way of destruction (5,000 weapons at a time) costs on an average US\$ 2.00/weapon. The objectives, however, are met abundantly.

## **6.0 CONCLUSIONS**

### **6.1 General conclusions**

The Weapons for Development component of the EU ASAC project can be labelled as successful and commands admiration. This is particularly based on the good relationship that has been built up with the authorities on national, provincial and district level. The assistance offered is fully accepted by the professional officials and there is an open communication on all aspects of the project. The Governors who were met spontaneously argued in favour of continuing the project in their province; the results of the project are well noticed and valued by them, their public authorities and the inhabitants of the project areas. Their appreciation is based on the increasing security as the people feel it, the development incentives received, the increased number of collected weapons and the decreasing number of armed crimes since the project was launched. The project contributes to an increasing confidence of the people in the public authorities.

With regard to the project itself it should be noticed that project staff is qualified and enthusiastic and is working as one team. The various characters and expertise form a natural job allocation and puts the right person in the right place. Weekly short staff meetings guarantee that all staff is informed about the progress and the activities that are planned in the various sectors of the project for the week that follows. A continuous reflection on the prioritisation of the selected activities within the chosen strategy, the services offered by the NGOs in the field, and the limitations of the budget, result in creative solutions.

The following paragraphs follow the evaluation requirements mentioned in the TOR.

## **6.2 Effectiveness**

TOR:

Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy of implementing a voluntary weapons hand- over programme using community-owned micro development incentives, public awareness campaigns and police capacity building for improving security and stability in the target areas as presented in the original concept documents of July and August 2000. (No single project document exists).

*Considering the short-term goal 1:*

*To improve physical security in the target area by encouraging the removal of as many weapons and, to a lesser extent, explosives held illegally by the civil population as possible.*

The mission concludes that the effectiveness of the project is unmistakable. The police recorded an increase in the number of collected weapons in the target areas since the project has started. Apart from this information on cached weapons in the forests is coming in. This is thanks to increasing confidence of people in the police and an enlarging network of information on and with former combatants. At the same time the mission has been informed of the substantial improvement of physical security as the number of armed crimes is decreasing. Records of the police and the diminishing fear of banditry that the people have expressed in surveys, are clear indicators.

*Short-term goal 2:*

*To raise public awareness about the negative effects weapons possession has on the community at large in terms of physical and human security and the progressive link between peace, security and development.*

As stated before, public awareness is the most important project component and is a leading tool, integrated in the WfD. To be trained in elements of this part of the programme like Law and Regulations, Human Rights, Morality, etc. together with the police and gendarmerie and in the presence of monks increases the confidence of the people in peace and security. The link with development is to a lesser extent part of the public awareness, but is mainly expressed in the provision of development incentives. An interesting example that business men see this link was observed in Kompong Spue province where a contractor of roads and irrigation schemes is paying Riel 10,000 (US\$ 2.50) per weapon to encourage the people to deliver their weapons.

A three days' training, together with the provision of manuals, posters, leaflets and showing the documentary video and dramatised video, has a great impact on a 'Weapons Free' Cambodia.

*Short-term goal 3:*

*To provide for greater visibility and mobility of the local police and gendarmerie.*

The provision of transport and communication equipment to the police is an essential part of this project. In remote areas having constant radio contact with the base gives the police itself a feeling of security and makes travelling in their target area less dangerous for them. The result is that bicycles and motorbikes are frequently used and that visibility and mobility has increased; as the police informed the mission that each village in the commune is now visited every day during one hour. An increase in security is obvious.

## **6.3 Comparison**

TOR:

Compare the cost effectiveness and different styles of project (large scale against small scale) in the light of the local social, economic and political environment in which the projects are taking place.

Main difference between large scale and small scale WfD project components is the initiator:

- Large scale initiated by EU ASAC
- Small scale initiated by local NGO

After analysing several options for voluntary weapon collection from the civilian population, and after conducting feasibility studies by EU ASAC in three provinces, the most promising approach seemed to be a "weapons in exchange for a development" incentive. Weapons for Development (WfD) could benefit communities as a whole since it has proven to be successful in other countries. The project decided to start so-called large-scale pilot projects in Snuol and Bakan districts. The small-scale projects are proposed by local NGOs in their working area based on their local knowledge and the good relation they have already with the inhabitants. This is in a large extent dependent on his character and the place the chairman or director of the NGO has in the society.

With comparison of the cost effectiveness of both categories of projects the consultant skates on thin ice. Costs can be compared<sup>8)</sup> and the conclusion is that the large-scale projects cost a multiple of the small-scale projects in money and time of project staff. The number of collected weapons can not be compared yet since the small-scale projects have just started in some areas. But besides of that comparable indicators are lacking.

The effectiveness of both project categories however is impressive when we consider e.g. the number of collected weapons. At one occasion the consultant attended the first meeting of a three days' training workshop on public awareness in a small-scale project. At that occasion some of the participants brought their weapons to deliver. Seven in total. The enthusiasm of the participants for the issue is remarkable and encouraging. The selection of civilians together with policemen and monks is contributing to the building of confidence. Why this enthusiasm? Because some incentives like wells will be received? Interviewing some participants it appeared that the main reason behind their enthusiasm is their war weariness and their discovery that the power of the gun has nothing yielded than pain, suffering, grief and poverty. People see the importance of the EU ASAC programme and enjoy the training. One NGO brought more than 150 people together in one training session. Others limit the group to 60-65 participants.

The space of time of the mission was too short to go into details like social, economic and political environment of the projects. Regarding the political aspect it has been noticed that isolated living members of Khmer Rouge are willing to turn in their weapons but are hesitating when the surrounding society has not accepted yet their turn of life being real. It are the local NGOs that do an admirable job building confidence on both sides.

Because of arguments mentioned above the mission supports the intention of EU ASAC to move away from more expensive and long running large-scale projects when NGOs exist in the target area, and to spread the WfD resources over a larger area increasing the number of beneficiaries.

## **7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **7.1 *Recommendations on revision of WfD strategies***

TOR:

Make recommendations on the revision of these strategies, on establishing better control mechanisms to monitor the advance of the project and on how to improve the success in achieving the stated goals.

#### **7.1.0 Better control mechanisms.**

For an outsider is not easy to get in a limited time a clear overview of what the project is about and in which phase the project is or the project components are. There is a lot of information

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<sup>8)</sup> see annex 6

on all the various components but it is dispersed and not easy to collect. To monitor the project it is necessary to develop a clear administrative management system. The mission recommends making the project visible through maps and tables. The maps will show the target areas in the Cambodian country map, the location of the development incentives and supported police posts, the implementing NGOs and other relevant information. The mission recommends publishing on a monthly basis per target area a standardised and accepted table that quantifies the status of the project and the (expected/estimated) final status. Numbers of collected arms and explosives, planned and implemented destruction ceremonies with the estimated number of weapons to be destroyed, numbers of armed crimes and conflicts, development projects and its expenditures as a percentage of its budget, police support, etc. will provide insight in the progress. Police and NGOs involved should deliver these figures.

Issues like feelings of security, confidence of the public in the police, knowledge about the project, project contribution to local human security and rural development, etc. do not fit in such a table but should be monitored through surveys. A questionnaire has been prepared with 33 questions that is filled in before the public awareness training by the trainees. Most of the questions are "yes/no" questions, which make it easy to put the answers into a database. The mission recommends repeating of the survey after six months not with the trainees but with the 'normal' people in the villages.

In the following paragraphs recommendations on public awareness, weapons collection and destruction, development incentives and police support will be described separately.

#### 7.1.1 Public Awareness

As mentioned before "public awareness" is at present a three days' training course together with the distribution of leaflets and posters. Training is mainly focusing on the knowledge of the related laws and regulations. The value of a weapons-free country for its development - directly related to the level of security achieved - is underexposed. "Security is peace. Peace is development." This message needs more emphasis. Some recommendations follow:

Public Awareness is education. Public Awareness on the danger of SALW belongs to the row of public awareness on Mines, HIV-Aids and Malaria. As such it needs a place in education programmes in schools and might be incorporated in history lessons. It is recommended to develop a curriculum with the Ministry of Education to be sponsored for example by UNICEF or the Soros Open Society Foundation. On sporting days' competitions winners might be rewarded with T-shirts printed with the Flames of Peace.

Public Awareness is national marketing. Success needs to be published. The bi-weekly "Police Blotter" (translated from two Khmer newspapers) in the Phnom Penh Post gives detailed information on crimes and accidents. It might be extended with a scale showing the number of collected and destroyed weapons together with the reduction of armed crimes over the months per province. It is recommended to contact these media through the police.

In this context it is also recommended that in the villages the police put signboards to inform the villagers when, where and how many weapons have been collected in their area. It both encourages the people that the collection is still continuing and it has a component of social control and transparency on what the police is doing.

Public Awareness is international marketing. Cambodia is known all over the world because of its filthy thirty years' war and the cruelties that have taken place. Much less known is how the country is miraculously changing. Two examples are interesting to mention.

One is a former Major General of the Cambodian Army (former Director of the Military Planning School), who is now the chairman of RKF, an NGO in Kampong Spue, raising awareness on the danger of weapons' possession and mobilising 150 people from police, gendarmerie, civilians and monks for a three days' training. He collects - successfully - information on the locations of arms caches because " ...I do not believe anymore in the power of the gun".

Second is a former commander of Khmer Rouge who has been elected as the chairman of the Community Council of Ta Ken Koh Sla in Chhouk District in Kampot province. The awareness training in his area will take place mid December but he already collected 220

weapons, based on his messages that: "The possession of weapons is dangerous" and "There should not be war again".

These are only two of many examples that Cambodia is breaking new ground. "Cambodia free of arms" might be exploited and promoted in the world. It will attract tourists; it might attract investors. It is essential for country's development and attention for this issue should continue to be given through education programmes, the international disarmament day, and others.

#### 7.1.2 Weapons collection and destruction.

As mentioned under 7.1.1 it is recommended to improve the involvement of the inhabitants of the target area with the results of the programme. The "Flames of Peace" are impressive ceremonies and much effort on the part of the Governor is focused on the gathering of thousands of spectators. Nevertheless, many of the inhabitants of the remote villages - although even the origin of the collected arms - are not in the position to travel to this spectacle. But it is essential that they see what finally happens to the weapons they have handed in. Therefore the mission strongly supports project's plan to organise destruction events at commune level. For the destruction of even a single weapon the permission of the Deputy Prime Minister as the chairman of the National Commission for Weapons Management and Reform is needed. At present various requests for destruction are waiting for approval hampering the progress of the destruction programme. It also increases the danger of a great number of only temporary stored arms. The mission therefore recommends discussing with the National Commission the option that destruction to a maximum number of 200 weapons in one ceremony might be carried out with permission of the Governor of the province concerned (delegated authority) only.

#### 7.1.3 Development incentives

There is no doubt about the success of the formula "Weapons for Development", despite all discussions and criticism on the adverb "for" and the proper meaning of the word "development". The question is how much attention, time and money should be spent by the project on this phenomenon without losing the benefits of it: encouragement, confidence, and international attention for the needs of the people of the target area on one side, and the integration of the project in different aspects and areas of the society on the other. Weapons collection should not be an activity far beyond the daily sorrows of the people, imposed by the authorities. The decision to deliver the weapon is a subject that needs to be discussed between wife and husband, children and parents, neighbours and villagers. The relation with development should not be terminated.

The decision to start small-scale programmes in seven provinces as an experiment parallel to the implementation of two large-scale pilot projects in two provinces has shown that investment with less money and time has a satisfying result. As indicated in the Analysis (chapter 5) it is difficult to qualify the results as better or worse because of different project areas with different war history, different people and different levels of poverty and needs. One difference in the strategy, however, between large and small-scale is that in the first category one NGO was invited to assist EU ASAC in its strategy, and that in the second category local NGOs submitted their proposals to co-operate with EU ASAC according to their strategy that might have the best success.

As mentioned it is not easy to conclude which strategy has the best results since comparable indicators are lacking. Nevertheless the local NGOs have a better knowledge which strategy will be successful in their target areas. Therefore the mission recommends to stop continuation of large-scale projects and to continue with the small-scale bottom-up approach because of the following precepts (already the basis for experimental execution):

1. Low cost of implementing, each project was budgeted at less than US\$ 30,000.
2. Supporting local civil society organisations and increasing their capacity (mandate of EU ASAC).

The mission recommends limiting the cost of incentives to a maximum of US\$ 10,000 per commune. The money should be spent on participatory community development through a local NGO following a standard procedure as introduced by SEILA (identification, prioritisation and selection through the Community Council). The funds that are freed by stopping the large-scale projects should be re-allocated to the small-scale projects to ensure maximum coverage. In areas where no local NGOs exist projects similar to the present large scale projects could be initiated, bearing in mind the other recommendations on relevant incentives.

#### 7.1.4 Police Support

Police support encompasses:

- Capacity building
- Provision of equipment
- Support to generate additional income for the police family.

It should be noticed that donors do not particularly favour support of the Police (particularly the provision of equipment). This is remarkable since good governance (and as a result security), which ranks high on the priority list of large donors, can not be achieved without the existence of a qualified police authority that has the confidence of the civilians. Knowledge of the laws and regulations, quick response to criminal activities, proper shelter, respectable and honest action, etc. are indispensable to achieve peace and security. Therefore this component can not be eliminated from the project.

## 7.2 Recommendations on co-operation

TOR:

Evaluate and make recommendations regarding the co-operation with other international, national and local organisations and its effectiveness in leading to achieving the stated goals.

Co-operation with national and local organisations is in full swing. There is no need to invite these organisations to co-operate. They present themselves from all over Cambodia with their specific expertise and experience in their target areas and spontaneously submit their proposals, thanks to their acquaintance with the project through public awareness and its promotion activities. Each proposal was assessed and a short list was made on the basis of the considerations as geographic location, security issues in the target area, apparent capacity and professionalism of the NGO, budget demands, political affiliation and desire to co-operate within a wider framework. Spontaneous proposals are difficult to compare. EU ASAC decided to standardise all aspects of the training in terms of budget lines, training materials and financial and narrative reporting and provision of small-scale development in the form of water wells. Co-operation is ongoing in the field of public awareness training programmes, capacity building of the police and their families, development activities, etc. The programme is extending to other target areas because local organisations initiate involvement with the project.

It should be noticed that EU ASAC is not a development organisation. Co-operation with other international organisations/agencies particularly in the field of development - part of the success formula of WfD - might enforce efforts of both of the programmes. The EU Delegation office was visited to learn how it might put into practice its slogan "Working together for a brighter Future" with e.g. EU ASAC. Many of their programmes are interesting to be linked with EU ASAC like Human Rights and Democracy, Human Resources Development, Rural Development, De-mining, etc. Besides it is almost not possible to explain why EU ASAC works isolated from EU Delegation activities. The Delegation is sometimes represented at formal celebrations of EU ASAC.

The response of one of the Senior Programme Officer on Rural Development and De-mining was: *"There is a possibility to co-operate in WfD through CMEA, which includes TA in Rural Development. This applies for the Mine Action Programme as well. PRASAC is a rural development programme to improve rural standards of living. Rural Development is part of the Ministry of Interior that has a strong relation with the Communes. This applies for EU ASAC as well. EU ASAC, however, has a high profile on the political agenda, like the Human Rights programme. There is a potential to co-operate. Maybe it works, but maybe political objective will get lost. There is, however, interest to be more involved."*

Important in thinking about co-operation or linking programmes is the intention to create a 'win win' situation for both programmes. Both programmes have a good reputation now. It should not be obscured because of administrative problems, which might arise.

Another international agency in development is, of course, UNDP. As the Department for Disarmament Affairs from New York has carried out some missions to Cambodia, the subject of SALW has obviously been on the agenda, since the Royal Government of Cambodia



addressed a letter to the Secretary General on 23 November 2000 to request assistance of the United Nations. It seems that apart from some recommendations in the Mission Report, DDA refrains from further involvement since it is too late for their mandate.

UNDP considers Mine Action and EU ASAC within the framework of conflict prevention and sees a clear opportunity to combine issues like Public Awareness and to co-ordinate weapons collection and storage and management through the National Commission. UNDP sees possibilities to be the focal point for co-operation with the Government on education surrounding the 'Arms Law' and to concentrate on capacity building of related institutions. It is worthwhile to investigate the possibilities in an informal meeting first. Also within the framework of conflict prevention, UNDP has plans to formulate a proposal on "Culture of Peace". Understaffing prevents realisation in the short term.

SEILA is operating the project "Partnership for Local Governance", a UN-project, implemented by UNOPS. As an Asian experiment this programme on decentralisation of planning by local governments started in 1996. First phase 1996-2000, budget US\$ 78 M. The government became convinced of the effectiveness of the approach and now it has been officially introduced. In 2001 the second phase started mobilising external resources and to change from policy making to implementing policy. SEILA currently operates in 17 of the 24 provinces, that is 70% of the country. A systematic approach of government reform systems is ongoing. An inter-ministerial task force channels US\$ 20-25 million through SEILA now. SEILA is feeding lessons now over the sub-national governments. The Senior Programme Advisor is of the opinion that the EU ASAC project component on capacity building and support to the police is very useful. Talking about the possibility to co-operate in target areas the Advisor prefers informal contact on each other's projects.

Japan has been directly involved in the WfD component of EU ASAC in Pursat province since April 2001, funding public awareness and the construction of schools in five districts through PRDC (Programme Rural Development Commission) using SEILA programme for detailed strategy. Development projects start only after an estimated number of weapons have been collected (based on 2,500 weapons per 10,000 households). Japan is not interested in taking part in the support of the police through for example capacity building, provision of equipment and family support. In 2003 Japan will start its own large-scale "Weapons for Development" projects in three still to be identified areas.

With this Japanese initiative an important integral component of the strategy as defined in close consultation with the Cambodian Government by EU ASAC, gets lost. A national approach will not be followed anymore in all the provinces of the country. The mission recommends that EU ASAC will bring this to the attention of the National Commission for advice. It might be possible that Japan is willing to exchange funding activities with EU ASAC like weapons registration, storage and management. In this way the Cambodian/EU ASAC philosophy on the integrated strategy throughout the country might be saved.

### **7.3 Donor assistance in continuing and extending the project**

TOR:

Formulate and present an opinion for the donor agencies concerning the necessity of expanding and continuing the Weapons for Development project in other areas of Cambodia.

The project, started in March 2001, has gained a lot of acknowledgement by and the appreciation of the government, the sub-national authorities and the people of Cambodia. In a covering letter dated 10 October 2002 to the National Assembly to enact the final draft of the Arms Law on weapons, explosives and ammunition, Prime Minister Hun Sen wrote inter alia the following:

*"With the implementation of Paris Peace Agreement, all fighting factions took part in the election, putting an end to the war in Cambodia. But no party that lost voluntarily bundled their guns and turned them over to the winner. Therefore, the weapons situation in Cambodia became anarchic and complicated. The effects of those weapons continue to severely threaten social security and order and even*

*cause tragedies to life and property almost every day, particularly obstructing the development process in all sectors.*

*The Royal Government of Cambodia has set out many appropriate principles aimed at collecting, confiscating and destroying weapons, explosives and ammunition and strengthening the management of weapons, explosives and ammunition, which proved to have achieved great achievements, bringing along the positive changes in security, safety and social order."*

Contributing to security and peace as preconditions for development in a country that was previously known because of suffering from an endless war with a high rate of cruelty and violence is satisfying. The present target districts have been selected based on their war history expecting quite a number of arms to be collected. A project like this should not be restricted to a few provinces only but needs to be extended over the whole country. Public awareness on the various aspects of security and development, collection and destruction of arms and support to maintaining of the various related Laws and Regulations as an integrated approach needs to be continued. Saying that it is obvious that this is particularly depending from the available EU-budget and an increased support of donors.

Continued support might also contribute to the security in the region. The mission advises to consider extending the project over the whole peninsula to exchange experience and to improve border control of illegal transports from or to Thailand, Lao and Vietnam, comparable with the regional approach that was started in the Balkans early in 2002.

#### **7.4 Summary of recommendations**

The recommendations mentioned in the paragraphs before can be divided in two categories:

1. Within the present project activities
  - Administrative management system with maps and monthly updated tables
  - Additional information to "Police Blotter"
  - International marketing through international media
  - Delegated authority on the decision to the destruction of less than 200 arms
  - Ending large scale projects, continuing small scale projects
2. Outside the ongoing project
  - Surveys
  - Education programme on schools
  - Signboards
  - Police support in Japanese target areas
  - Starting a Regional S.E. Asia SALW project.

Following up the recommendations the first category does not need additional funding, the second category does. Regarding the EU-budget with a minimum of staff and operational costs, in 2002 € 1,049,400 was available for project activities; that was 59.3% of the total budget. In 2003 only € 857,100 will be available for project activities, which is 54.7% of the planned budget. This shows a decrease of € 192,300 or 4.6%. This is a reflection of the overall decrease of 15% in EU ASAC's EU-supported budget in 2003.

At present, the participating donors are funding the following components:

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Project component</b>
EU	Overhead Registration and storage of military weapons Destruction Arms law Public awareness by large national NGOs, not necessarily related with WfD WfD: Public awareness US\$ 25,000 per large-scale project Field office of the two large-scale projects € 250,000 for small-scale projects
Japan	Development projects in Pursat Japanese public awareness outside EU ASAC working areas
Netherlands	Development projects in Kratie (ends November 2002)
GTZ	Police support
Canada	Code of conduct (ended)
WFP	Food for Work
United Kingdom	Police component in Pursat 2003

The mission recommends the Project Manager to submit a proposal to the Council of Ministers on the duration of the Weapons Management Project as a whole and of its components with indicative budgets and planning, and to formulate an indication on the exit strategy. Capacity building of the police and the NGOs involved will benefit in quality when start and finish of programmes will not be influenced by the limitations of a fiscal calendar (and planning) year.

## **ANNEXES**

1. Terms of Reference
2. Overview of development incentives and collected weapons in Snuol District
3. Overview of police support in Snuol District
4. Overview of development incentives and collected weapons in Bakan District
5. Overview of police support in Bakan District
6. Comparison of costs of large-scale and small-scale WfD project components
7. List of persons met and/or visited target areas

**Terms of Reference for an Evaluation of Weapons for Development  
(covering the pilot projects in Kratie and Pursat Provinces and the small-scale NGO  
WfD projects)**

**1. Objectives of the Evaluation**

A final evaluation of the structure, implementation, management and perceived impact of the two large scale Weapons for Development pilot projects in Snuol District (Kratie Province) and Bakan District (Pursat Province) and the effectiveness of the above projects in relation to the smaller scale Weapons for Development project currently operating in seven provinces in Cambodia. The Evaluation needs to consider these projects individually and in terms of how the Weapons for Development concept has been developed and implemented under EU ASAC.

**2. Requirements of the Evaluation**

- A. Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy of implementing a voluntary weapons hand-over programme using community-owned micro development incentives, public awareness campaigns and police capacity building for improving security and stability in the target areas as presented in the original concept documents of July and August 2000. (No single project document exists).
- B. Compare the cost effectiveness and different styles of project (large scale against small scale) in the light of the local social, economic and political environment in which the projects are taking place.
- C. Make recommendations on the revision of these strategies, on establishing better control mechanisms to monitor the advance of the project and on how to improve the success in achieving the stated goals.
- D. Evaluate and make recommendations regarding the cooperation with other international, national and local organisations and its effectiveness in leading to achieving the stated goals.
- E. Formulate and present an opinion for the donor agencies concerning the necessity of expanding and continuing the Weapons for Development project in other areas of Cambodia.

**3. Activities of the Consultant**

It is expected that the consultant will have to engage in the following activities in order to effectively carry out the implementation of the evaluation:

3.1. A research period in the capital, Phnom Penh: This will involve meeting with various EU ASAC staff including the Programme Manager, the WfD Project Officer and the EU ASAC Accountant. It will also involve meeting with various organisations involved in the WfD project, for example Partners for Development (an international NGO responsible for the provision of development in Snuol District.) This period will allow the consultant access to all documents, data and individuals relevant to the evaluation. It is expected that this period will sandwich any field visits and that the consultant will be provided adequate time and resources to collate his work. It is expected that the Consultant will provide EU ASAC with a draft of the final report before his final departure from Phnom Penh. The final report is expected to be no more than 25 pages excluding appropriate Annexes.

3.2. Field Visits to large-scale WfD pilot projects: It is expected that the consultant will visit both pilot project target areas in Pursat and Kratie. During these visits, the consultant will meet with the EU ASAC WfD field managers and with organisations involved with implementing aspects of the pilot projects. He will also be expected to inspect the development provided under the project and speak to local target groups. He will also be expected to meet with the police in both target areas to assess the impact of the police support component. This last element is considered very important. It will be the responsibility of EU ASAC to provide the Consultant with a travel schedule for the required field visits and all logistic support necessary for him to effectively carry out the evaluation.

3.3. Field Visits to small-scale WfD projects: It is expected that the consultant will visit a number of small scale WfD projects which will include meeting with the NGO responsible for implementing the project in that area (and possibly attending a public awareness workshop),

representatives of the security forces in that area and also local people. It is not expected that the consultant visit every project since time and expense constraints make such activity prohibitive. The responsibilities of EU ASAC will remain as per point 3.2.

#### 4. Background

##### Large Scale Weapons for Development Projects

EU ASAC is currently running two large scale WfD pilot projects in 2 provinces in Cambodia; Pursat (in the North West) and Kratie (in the South East, close to the Vietnamese border). Both projects are confined to 5 communes (the lowest level of local government in Cambodia) in one district – so 5 communes in Bakan District in Pursat and 5 communes in Snuol District in Kratie.

These WfD projects consist of 4 inter-related strategy components:

1. Public Awareness on the negative effects of weapons possession on peace, security and development prospects.
2. Police Support – Consisting of: a) Human rights and good governance training b) professional skills training c) provision of basic technical equipment e.g. motorbikes, radios etc. d) provision of sustainable income generation training / support to the families of the police. Weapons often continued to be retained due to the inability of the police to provide effective security.
3. Provision of community-owned development incentives e.g. water wells, health posts, schools, rural roads etc. depending on development priorities in the village. This is **not** a buy back scheme and no financial or individual rewards are provided. Rather the development is intended to demonstrate the progressive link between peace, security and development. It must be stressed that WfD is **not** a development programme but rather a weapons collection programme, which aims to increase physical security primarily and human security as a related effect. The programme must therefore be evaluated as such.
4. Collection and destruction of weapons from the civil population – Though it should be noted that neither EU ASAC nor client NGOs actually collect weapons but rather encourage the local community to voluntarily hand them over to the police. It should be noted that accurate numbers of weapons originally held in the target areas were almost impossible to quantify, thereby making it impossible to use the number of collected weapons as the sole indicator of the progress towards the achievement of the objectives. By its very nature, WfD is a political rather than a development project.

Short-term Goals:

1. To improve physical security in the target area by encouraging the removal of as many weapons and, to a lesser extent, explosives held illegally by the civil population as possible.
2. To raise public awareness about the negative effects weapons possession has on the community at large in terms of physical and human security and the progressive link between peace, security and development.
3. To provide for greater visibility and mobility of the local police and gendarmerie

Mid-term Goals:

1. To increase the sense of trust within and between local communities
2. To increase the trust between local communities and the institutions responsible for the provision of security i.e. the police and gendarmerie.
3. To strengthen local civil society organisations.
4. To sensitise local and national authorities to the benefits of voluntary weapons hand in programmes.
5. To provide a modicum of human security improvement through the provision of small scale community owned development projects.

### Long-Term Goals

1. To improve the overall professionalism of the police and gendarmerie to a degree relative to the extent of the support provided.
2. To improve the human security of the local civil population through opening the area up to investment and development from other agencies.
3. To decrease the overall extent of violence within and between communities and provide the basis for long-term sustainable security and development.

Both these projects began in 2001 and are now nearing completion. Thus far, about 3,200 weapons and 14,500 explosives in Kratie and 2,500 weapons and 4,200 explosives in Pursat have been voluntarily handed in by the civil population. These weapons were mostly those which people kept on their properties, though approximately 1,000 have come from weapons caches revealed by the target groups.

In Kratie, the project was funded by the EU, the Netherlands government (police support and development) and Canadian government (human rights training). In Pursat the project was funded by the EU, the Japanese government (development) and the German government (police support).

### **Small Scale Weapons for Development Projects**

In addition to the large scale projects, EU ASAC is also running smaller scale projects which do not include the police support component and provide smaller scale development (only water wells). These projects are implemented solely by local Khmer NGOs (the larger scale projects have a resident Khmer EU ASAC field manager) who conduct public awareness workshops in the target areas.

Following a pilot project involving two local NGOs in 2001, this project has been expanded in 2002 to seven provinces: Kompong Spue, Kompong Cham, Kompong Som, Pailin, Battambang, Takeo and Kompot. EU ASAC has provided the NGOs with training (on financial and narrative reporting and on presentation techniques), training materials (a training manual for participants and a more detailed one for trainers and two public awareness films; a documentary and a drama) and equipment (a DVD player, generator etc.).

These projects began in mid-May 2002 and as at 11 September 2002 over 1,500 weapons have been handed in by the target groups.

### **Future Weapons for Development Projects**

Following the success of the two large scale pilot projects, EU ASAC intends to expand the programme in late 2002 / early 2003. EU ASAC intends to reduce its direct involvement in the development component of WfD by seeking experienced partner agencies who already offer development and adding the weapons reduction components (public awareness and police assistance) to the existing, planned development projects.

Pending the securing of funds, WfD projects will run in:

1. Another District in Pursat Province (development-Japanese government, police support – possibly the British and German government)
2. Kompong Thom Province (development and police support – German government)
3. Sambour District, Kratie Province (possibly with support from the Belgian government)
4. EU ASAC is also looking to cooperate with CARE Cambodia who is operating an Integrated Demining Development Project (IDDP) in Battambang Province. This new project will combine demining and mine awareness with development and weapons awareness / collection.
5. EU ASAC is also looking at the possibility of adding a police training component to the smaller scale projects though without the equipment provision and family support.